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INSURANCE DECISIONS DURING THE PAST YEAR
JOSEPH L. NETTLES*
Fraudulent Breac. of Contract
Two cases during the year involved "fraudulent breach"
of the insurance contract. While it has long been declared that
breach of contract accompanied by "fraudulent intent" is not
sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages, but that
there must be a "fraudulent act" accompanying the breach,
the distinguishing characteristics of such "fraudulent" act
have been more hinted at than delineated. In the two cases
decided by the Court during the year upon this point, little
appears which could be taken as rationale: The Court holds
only that the evidence is sufficient to raise the inference that
a fraudulent breach had occurred.
In Yarborough v. Bankers Life & Casualty Company,1 the
insurer notified the insured that it would not renew his month-
ly health and accident policies unless he consented to a rider
to the policies with certain exclusions. The purpose of the
letter apparently was to reject the premium due February 20,
1951, and tendered on February 26, 1951; but the letter was
not written until March 22, by which time another premium
would have been due. Plaintiff immediately replied, electing
to rescind, and requesting the refund of the "last $15.85 pay-
ment." Apparently only $7.50 had actually been paid on
February 26, but the insurer made the requested refund. How-
ever, this refund was not made until May 1951, and mean-
while the plaintiff had made two other payments of $15.85.
Demand was made for the return of the two additional pay-
ments. The company denied knowledge of any further pay-
ments, but later refunded one. Finally, suit was brought and
a verdict for $7.50 actual damages and $1,000.00 punitive
damages was returned. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court. The Court seemed much impressed that the defend-
ant offered no evidence to explain the incongruities. It held
that while some of the separate acts of the insurer might
not evidence bad faith, all the circumstances, considered to-
*Attorney at Law, Columbia, S. C.
1. 81 S.E. 2d 359 (S.C. 1954).
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gether, warranted an inference of fraudulent acts accompany-
ing a breach of contract.
Simmons v. Service Life and Health Insurance Company
2
likewise was a case of unexplained questionable acts, though
the defendant's failure to present evidence was apparently
not voluntary but the result of the trial court's directing a
verdict for the plaintiff of its own motion. Plaintiff was
apparently as illiterate as he was uninsurable when the agent
issued the policy to him. Premiums were collected which ag-
gregated considerably more than the death benefit; these pre-
miums had always been picked up at the plaintiff's home by
the insurer's agent. But the agent ceased to call, and the
insurer thereupon lapsed the policy for non-payment of pre-
mium. Suit was brought for fraudulent breach in the cancel-
lation. The insurer moved for a nonsuit; this motion was
denied and the trial court of its own motion directed a ver-
dict in favor of the plaintiff for $150.00 (the death benefit
payable under the policy) actual damages. Plaintiff appealed,
contending that the evidence presented a jury issue as to
fraudulent breach. The Supreme Court concurred. Here
again, the Court does not go into discussion as to what is a
"fraudulent act" but simply holds that plaintiff's evidence,
standing alone (unexplained?), was sufficient on motion for
nonsuit.
Contingent B.eneficiary's Suit for Cancellation
Babb v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Co.3 seems to repre-
sent a departure. The plaintiff's husband had a policy with
the defendant providing for disability benefits and a $7,500.00
accidental death benefit; the plaintiff was the beneficiary, but
the right was reserved under the policy to change the bene-
ficiary. In 1948, the insurer paid $638.00 to plaintiff's husband
for surrender of the policy. Plaintiff's husband died in 1951;
plaintiff demanded the death benefit, was refused, and brought
suit. Although originally brought upon three counts, the case
narrowed down to the question whether the plaintiff, as bene-
ficiary, could bring an action in tort for fraud practiced upon
her husband to secure the cancellation of the policy in which
she was named beneficiary.
The Court held that she was so entitled. In so doing, it
2. 223 S.C. 407, 76 S.E. 2d 288 (1953).
3. 224 S.C. 1, 77 S.E. 2d 267 (1953).
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would seem that the Court effectively overruled the case of
Shuler v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,4 though it rather
sought to distinguish it. The Shuler case was a suit by the
beneficiary for wrongful cancellation of her husband's policy,
and was brought while her husband, the insured, was still
alive. The right was reserved to change the beneficiary and
the Court held that the action therefore would not lie. The
majority of the Court in the Babb case construed the Shuler
case as holding only that the action by the beneficiary was pre-
mature until the insured had died without changing the bene-
ficiary, thereby inferring that the action might be maintained
after the death. Mr. Justice Oxner dissented, pointing out
the anomaly of holding that no right of action arose in the
plaintiff when the alleged fraud was committed, but did
arise several years later when her husband died, at which
time the policy had by hypothesis been cancelled for some
years.
It is difficult to see how this case and the language of the
Shuler case can live in the same state. The use of the word
"premature" in the Shuler case is ambiguous, but there is no
ambiguity in the flat statement there made that the interest
of the beneficiary was too hypothetical to be made the ground
of damages: "It is a mere expectancy of unascertainable value,
and hence cannot be made the basis of a claim for damages."
It would seem that the real decision in the Shuler case is that
although the cancellation of the policy in which the insured
was a contingent beneficiary was a wrong as to such rights
as the plaintiff had, nevertheless it was damnum absque in-
juria and hence gave rise to no action.
Total Disability
Adair v. New York Life Ins. Co.,5 decided during the year,
was in line with the Court's previous decisions in similar cir-
cumstances. Adair was issued a policy by defendant in 1935
when he was then about twenty-two years of age and a clerk in
a drug store. In 1940, he changed his job to selling ladies' hos-
iery on commission basis over a large territory which he cov-
ered by automobile. He began having trouble with his left
foot in 1942, which handicapped his travelling. In 1944 the
foot was amputated below the knee and he used an artificial
4. 184 S.C. 485, 193 S.E. 46 (1937).
5. 224 S.C. 344, 79 S.E. 2d 316 (1953).
[Vol. 7
3
Nettles: Insurance Decisions during the Past Year
Published by Scholar Commons, 1954
SuRvEY oV SOUTH CARoIaNA LAW
leg. In 1949, he changed to a job as automobile salesman.
Finally, in 1951, plaintiff and another formed a corporate au-
tomobile agency. Adair was one-third owner and was named
president and secretary. His salary in 1951 was $4,200.00 a
year; his commissions in 1942 were $4,800.00 a year. On suit
for compensation under the total disability clause of the policy,
the insurer claimed that the plaintiff was able to carry out
the new employment, which reasonably approached his for-
mer employment prior to the disability and hence was not
totally disabled. The insured contended that he was unable
to do everything usually done by one in his present occupa-
tion.
On defendant's appeal from denial of a directed verdict,
the Court gave judgment for the defendant, holding that as a
matter of law the insured was not totally disabled. The Court's
decision was to be expected in view of Moyle v. Mutual Life
Insurance eompany of New York,8 as the cases were almost
on all fours. Plaintiff made the rather interesting point that
$4,200.00 in the year 1951-52 was not comparable to $4,800.00
in 1942, but the Court held that the comparison should rather
be what the plaintiff earned in 1951-52 as against what he
would have earned in his former occupation in the same period
-as to which there was no evidence.
Vickery v. American National Insurance Company,7 decided
in February 1954, seems to be the first case which has come
before the Court upon a -policy in which the criterion of bene-
fits is whether or not the insured is "continuously confined
within doors." However, the Court does not construe this
provision of the policy, nor is the evidence recounted. The
holding simply is that it was improper for the trial court to
direct a verdict in favor of the plaintiff when there was a
conflict in the evidence.
Fire Insurance
Only two of the cases decided during the year involved fire
insurance. Hurst v. Donegal & Conoy Mutual Fire Insurance
Company8 involved the clause in the standard policy suspend-
ing coverage while the property is vacant or unoccupied be-
yond a period of sixty consecutive days. Prior to December
6. 201 S.C. 146, 21 S.E. 2d 561 (1942).
7. 224 S.C. 549, 80 S.E. 2d 233 (1954).
8. 224 S.C. 188, 78 S.E. 2d 189 (1953).
1954]
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12, 1950, the plaintiff applied for insurance on a farm tenant
house; the agent inspected the house, which was vacant then,
and prepared a policy dated December 12. Before delivering
the policy, the agent required the plaintiff to obtain some
instrument from his father, the owner of the property, show-
ing that the plaintiff had an insurable interest. This was done
about January 15, 1951, whereupon the premium was paid
and the policy delivered by the agent to the plaintiff. On Feb-
ruary 16 the house was destroyed, having remained vacant
until that time. The lower court held that the parties did not
intend the policy to become effective until the condition prece-
dent (furnishing proof of insurable interest) had been com-
plied with; that this was done and the policy delivered on
January 15; and that since the premises had not been un-
occupied for sixty days from that date at the time of its de-
struction the exclusion was inapplicable.
Although the facts of the case would seem to fall within the
majority rule that issuance of a policy with knowledge that
the premises are vacant waives the vacancy exception in the
policy insofar as the existing vacancy is concerned, 9 the Court
did not base its decision upon that ground. Instead, it con-
strued the exclusion as requiring sixty days of unoccupancy
while the policy was in force without regard to previous con-
dition. It is one of the few decisions upon this point.'0
The policy was held never to have become effective in Hin-
son v. Catawbc Insurance Company." There, the plaintiff
wrote from his home in Laurens to an insurance agent in
Charleston, wishing to insure his house at "507 W. Ashley
Avenue." A policy was issued, describing the location of the
risk as "507 W. Ashley Avenue, Charleston, S. C." Plaintiff
did not read the policy. The house was in fact located on
Folly Beach, where the premium rate was about three times
as high as for the City of Charleston. The Supreme Court
held that the lower court properly directed a verdict in favor
of the insurer, since the minds of the parties had not met as
to the risk.
It would seem that there unquestionably was no real con-
tract here, since the risk was never correctly identified. Prob-
ably the most significant thing about the opinion is the prop-
9. See note, 96 A.L.R. 1259 (1935).
10. 4 AJPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 2844 (1941).
11. 224 S.C. 227, 78 S.E. 2d 235 (1953).
[Vol. 7
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osition that a correct description of the risk is as much the
responsibility of the assured as the insurer.
Automobile Insurance
Padgett v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. 12 is concerned with the
extent of the insurer's obligation under an automobile collision
policy. There was evidence that the insured car suffered a
hole in the oil pan when, unknown to the driver, it collided
with some object in the road. The oil leaked from the engine,
which became extensively damaged from operation without oil.
Plaintiff undertook to have repairs made. Later, he made
claim on the insurer. The Court held that the plaintiff was
entitled to have his car placed in as good condition as before
the collision damage, even if it required a new engine; how-
ever, he was limited to this amount less his deductible. He
could not recover the original cost of repairs, together with a
further sum claimed for depreciation in value on account of
defective performance. The Court assumed, without actually
deciding, that the collision policy would cover damage to the
engine by operation without oil, where a hole drained the oil
out of the engine. This is one of the few cases in the country
where this particular point was involved.
Marine Insurance
Land v. Franklin National Ins. Co.'s is one of the few South
Carolina cases of recent years involving the marine insurance
contract. Plaintiff operated a boat on Lake Murray. The boat
sank in quiet waters. The only explanation offered for the
sinking was that of the plaintiff, that the seams had opened
as a result of high speed operation, and this was not disputed.
The lower court held that sinking came within the coverage
of the policy as by "peril of the sea" or by "latent defect."
The Supreme Court held that it was not due to latent defect;
it then held that the evidence warranted a finding that the
sinking was by a peril of the sea.
The writer confesses to bias, in view of his having been the
losing attorney. Nevertheless, the opinion does seem open to
the criticism that its effect is to make any sinking a peril
of the sea, something which several hundred years of marine
insurance decisions have consistently denied. While there are
12. 223 S.C. 533, 77 S.E. 2d 219 (1953).
13. 225 S.C. 33, 80 S.E. 2d 420 (1954).
1954]
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decisions that the unexplained sinking of a seaworthy craft
will raise an inference that the sinking was caused by some
peril of the sea, the undisputed explanation here was that of
general hull weakness. This was not an unexplained sinking
and does not fall within that rule.
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